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MISSOURI V. SEIBERT: THE
MULTIFACTOR TEST SHOULD BE
REPLACED WITH A BRIGHT-LINE
WARNING RULE TO STRENGTHEN
MIRANDA'S CLARITY
SETH GOLDBERG*
Miranda v. Arizona,' one of the most widely known Supreme
Court decisions, 2 has been the source of much controversy since
its inception. 3 Miranda requires the police to tell a suspect in
custody that she has the right to remain silent and the right to
the assistance of counsel during the interrogation.
4
* J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. 2003,
Binghamton University.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.01 (3d ed.
2002); see also Mandy DeFilippo, You Have the Right to Better Safeguards: Looking
Beyond Miranda in the New Millennium, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 637 (2001)
(declaring that "Miranda v. Arizona is one of the most widely known [opinions] in
American jurisprudence"); Michael Edmund O'Neill, Miranda Remediated, 3 GREEN
BAG 2D 149, 149 (2000) (stating that Miranda v. Arizona is "easily the most
recognized case in the American criminal procedure pantheon"); Irene Merker
Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial
Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 69-72 (1989) (showing the recitation of Miranda
warnings in a Spiderman comic); Jan Hoffman, Police Tactics Chipping Away at
Suspects' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al (explaining that the general
public is familiar with the Miranda warnings because police programs and movies
on television have served to popularize them).
3 The Miranda opinion has been one of the most heavily criticized criminal
procedure decisions. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 24.01. When the case was
initially decided, many police officers and legislators believed that the decision
would hinder the ability of law enforcement agencies to obtain confessions. Id. Yet,
more recently, others have criticized the decision for "not going far enough" to
protect the rights of suspects. Id.
4 The Miranda Court devised the following rule:
mhe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
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Furthermore, Miranda states that any response to police
questioning is inadmissible unless the police obtain a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. 5 Although the
Miranda Court "indicated that it was adopting stringent waiver
requirements, "6 the Court in post-Miranda cases did not strictly
adhere to this decision.7 In post-Miranda cases, the Supreme
Court established a number of exceptions to Miranda's warning
and waiver rules8 that effectively weakened Miranda's impact on
significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the
following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person mustbe warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to thepresence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may
waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone
and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does notdeprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
5 See id.
6 Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators'
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397,409 (1999). "[A]s prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a
suspect, the Court mandated that a clear warning of rights must be given and a
waiver received." Melissa A. Register, Comment, Constitutional Law: The InvisibleLine Between Intentional and Unintentional Miranda Violations: Missouri v. Seibert,93 S. W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002), 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 339, 341 (2004); see DonaldA. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and
the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV 1, 19 (2001)(stating that the purpose of the Miranda warning is to dispel "the compulsion
implicit in custodial questioning"); Paul Marcus, A Return to the "Bright Line Rule"
of Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV 93, 112 (1993) (noting various Supreme Court
Justices' opinions praising the "rigidity" of Miranda's rules).
7 See Leo & White, supra note 6, at 409 (stating that "[post-Miranda decisionshave been less strict, however, in mandating specific requirements designed to
ensure that suspects freely waive their Miranda rights").
8 See DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 639 (stating that "[s]ince Miranda was decided,
the Supreme Court has established a number of exceptions to its seemingly bright-line standard"); Marcus, supra note 6, at 112 (explaining that Miranda has become
"riddled by exceptions, limitations and very particularized factual inquiries"); id. at143 (explaining that these exceptions to Miranda were developed by the Supreme
Court to aid law enforcement); O'Neill, supra note 2, at 149 (declaring that while theMiranda doctrine is still standing, it has been effectively weakened by the
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law enforcement. 9 Consequently, interrogators found ways to
circumvent the protections provided by the Miranda warnings.
10
Recently, in Missouri v. Seibert," the Supreme Court analyzed
the "question-first" interrogation technique used by police to
circumvent Miranda,12 and held that the petitioner's confession
obtained by the use of this strategy was inadmissible at trial.
1 3
Petitioner Patrice Seibert alleged that her statements to the
police should be suppressed because her Miranda rights had
been violated due to improper police interrogation techniques.
14
Seibert was arrested for helping to plan an arson fire that lead to
the death of a seventeen-year-old family friend. 15 Employing a
two-step interrogation technique, called the "question-first"
tactic, the police did not give Seibert her Miranda warnings until
they obtained from her an initial confession. 16 After eliciting a
confession, a police officer gave Seibert her Miranda warnings
and obtained from her a signed waiver of rights. 17 The officer re-
questioned the petitioner and had her repeat her initial
statements in order to obtain a "mirandized' confession that
could be admitted as evidence at trial.'8 Seibert argued that the
exceptions developed by the Supreme Court); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 2,
at 74 (asserting that these exceptions and politics have stripped Miranda of its
value).
9 Leo & White, supra note 6, at 409 (explaining that because the post-Miranda
cases have provided police officials with the opportunity to "circumvent" the
Miranda warnings in particular situations, these decisions have significantly
weakened Miranda's impact on law enforcement).
1o See DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 639 (explaining that police officers are taught,
through training manuals and courses, how to convince suspects to waive their
Miranda rights and confess).
11 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
12 See generally id.
13 Id. at 604 (plurality opinion) (explaining that "[b]ecause this midstream
recitation of warnings after interrogation and unwarned confession could not
effectively comply with Miranda's constitutional requirement, we hold that a
statement repeated after a warning in such circumstances is inadmissible").
14 See id. at 605 (stating that "Seibert sought to exclude both her prewarning
and postwarning statements").
15 Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (Mo. 2002).
16 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
17 Id.
18 Id. (explaining that after Seibert made her unwarned confession, officer
Hanrahan resumed questioning and confronted her with her prewarning
statements). Another police officer working in the same department as officer
Hanrahan explained that this type of two-step interrogation was not confined solely
to their precinct in Missouri. See id. at 609. This officer further stated that this
interrogation technique had been emphasized by other police departments he had
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"question-first" interrogation strategy used by the police violated
her Miranda rights, and therefore, her "mirandized" confession
should be deemed inadmissible at trial.19 The Supreme Court of
the United States agreed with Seibert, concluding that Seibert's
post-warning statements were inadmissible at trial because the
warnings given to her did not serve their purpose.20
Writing for the plurality, Justice Souter explained that
Seibert's post-warning confession was inadmissible because the
Miranda warnings did not "adequately and effectively"21 advise
Seibert of her rights.22 Using a multifactor test,23 the Court
reached its decision by examining the circumstances of Seibert's
interrogation.24 The Court concluded, in consideration of these
circumstances, that the Miranda warnings in Seibert's case were
not effective because a reasonable person in Seibert's shoes
would not have understood her rights.25 Therefore, the Court
held that Seibert's post-warning statements were inadmissible at
trial.26
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed with the
worked for and by a national police training organization. See id. In Illinois, the
Police Law Institute instructs officers how to elicit an admissible confession from a
suspect utilizing this very technique. See id. at 610.
19 See id. at 606.
20 See id. at 609-17 (indicating that the Miranda warnings did not effectively
advise Seibert of her rights).
21 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (stating that "the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights
must be fully honored"); see also Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611 (plurality opinion)(explaining that the Miranda Court was concerned with interrogation tactics that
would "disable [an individual] from making a free and rational choice" when
deciding whether to speak to the police during an interrogation) (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 464-65).
22 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 609-17 (plurality opinion) (indicating that the
Miranda warnings did not effectively advise Seibert of her rights).
23 Under the multifactor test, the Court examined:
the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round
of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing
and setting of the first and the second [rounds], the continuity of police
personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the
second round as continuous with the first.
Id. at 615.
24 See id. at 615-16.
25 See id. at 617 (stating that the circumstances in Seibert's case "must be seen
as challenging the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the
point that a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would not have understood
them to convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk").
26 Id. at 617.
1290 [Vol. 79:1287
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plurality that Seibert's post-warning statements were
inadmissible at trial.27 Nonetheless, he rejected the multifactor
test that the Court used to reach this decision. 28  Justice
Kennedy argued that because the multifactor test requires lower
courts to assess the circumstances surrounding every two-step
interrogation,29 this test would serve to undermine Miranda's
clarity. 30 Consequently, Justice Kennedy proposed an alternative
solution limited to intentional two-step interrogations only.
31
Justice Kennedy explained that if police deliberately employ a
two-step interrogation strategy, any post-warning statements
relating to the substance of the pre-warning statements "must be
excluded unless curative measures are taken before the
postwarning statement is made. '32 Justice Kennedy suggested
that an additional warning may suffice as one type of curative
measure.
33
It is submitted that although the ultimate conclusion in
Seibert is correct, the multifactor test that the Court devised
should be replaced with a "bright-line" warning rule. Similar to
Justice Kennedy's argument, this Comment argues that the
multifactor test should be discarded because it does not
adequately protect suspects. 34 Instead, the Court should devise a
bright-line rule requiring police to recite an additional warning
to the suspect that emphasizes the likely inadmissibility of her
pre-warning statements. 35 Different from Justice Kennedy's
27 See id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he plurality opinion
is correct to conclude that statements obtained through the use of this technique are
inadmissible").
28 See id. at 621-22 (rejecting the plurality's use of the multifactor test).
29 See id. at 621 (explaining that the multifactor test "envisions an objective
inquiry from the perspective of the suspect, and applies in the case of both
intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations").
30 See id. at 622 (stating that "Miranda's clarity is one of its strengths, and a
multifactor test that applies to every two-stage interrogation may serve to
undermine that clarity").
31 See id. (declaring that Justice Kennedy "would apply a narrower test
applicable only in the infrequent case, such as we have here, in which the two-step
interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda
warning").
32 Id. at 622.
33 See id. (explaining that "an additional warning that explains the likely
inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement may be sufficient" to render a
confession admissible at trial).
34 See id. (stating that the multifactor test undermines Miranda's clarity).
35 See id. (declaring that "an additional warning that explains the likely
inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement may be sufficient").
12912005]
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concurrence, this Comment proposes that this supplemental
warning should be mandatory for officers to recite to suspects in
both intentional and unintentional two-step interrogations.
Unlike the multifactor test, this bright-line warning rule would
adequately protect suspects because it would promote the clarity
that Miranda originally attempted to establish.
Part I of this Comment reviews the history of interrogation
law that led to Miranda and the post-Miranda cases. Part II
discusses current interrogation techniques used by police to
circumvent Miranda, and in particular, examines the "question-
first" interrogation technique. Part III rejects Seibert's
multifactor test used to analyze "question-first" interrogations.
Part IV proposes that the multifactor test should be replaced
with a bright-line warning rule.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERROGATION LAW
A confession is widely viewed as the most reliable evidence of
guilt.36  Because a confession "largely ensures a conviction, ' 37
police commonly interrogate suspects in the hope of obtaining
one.38 Over the past century, police interrogation procedures
have evolved from the use of violence to the psychological
manipulation of suspects.39 Consequently, over the years, the
Supreme Court has responded to these changes by attempting to
establish limits on law enforcement practices. 40
36 Edwin D. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV
L. REV. 42, 42-43 (1968). Staundford, in Pleas of the Crown, asserts:
If one is indicted or appealed of felony, and on his arraignment he confesses
it, this is the best and surest answer that can be in our law for quieting the
conscience of the judge and for making it a good and firm condemnation,
provided, however, that the said confession did not proceed from fear,
menace, or duress; which if it was the case, and the judge had become
aware of it, he ought not to receive or record this confession, but cause him
to plead not guilty and take an inquest to try the matter.
Id. (quoting GUILLIAULME STAUNDFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORONE 142a-b (1607)
(translated from law French)).
37 Id. at 42.
38 See Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth
Amendment: The Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a
"Trial Right" in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1030-31 (2003)(explaining that in the mid-nineteenth century police agencies began interrogating
criminal suspects before trial).
39 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 24.02 (discussing the shift in police
interrogation strategies from the use of physical force to the use of psychological
manipulation).
40 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) (explaining that
1292 [Vol. 79:1287
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A. The Court Implemented a Voluntariness Standard to Protect
Suspects
Throughout the first third of the twentieth century, in order
to illicit confessions, police "'routinely threatened, beat, and
tortured suspects."' 41  Consequently, when confronted with the
initial confession cases, the Supreme Court sought to protect
suspects from "cruel and abusive police tactics" by establishing
that a suspect's confession must be made voluntarily in order to
be admissible at trial. 42 Although the voluntariness standard
adopted by the Supreme Court was originally regarded as a
common law rule of evidence, 43 subsequent cases established
constitutional bases for the suppression of an involuntary
confession. 44
The Supreme Court, in Bram and Brown identified two
different constitutional bases for suppressing an involuntary
confession.45 In 1897, in Brain v. United States,46 the Supreme
the Court was attempting to clarify confession law by establishing "concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow").
41 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 22.02 (quoting Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo,
The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True
and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 189, 189 (1997); see also Steven
Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L.
309, 336 (1998) (discussing the abusive practices that were used by the police
including "beating[s] with fists, blackjacks, rubber hoses, and telephone books; the
use of hot lights; confinement[s] in airless and fetid rooms; and hanging[s] from
windows").
42 See Timothy Brennan, Silencing Miranda: Exploring Potential Reform to the
Law of Confessions in the Wake of Dickerson v. United States, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 253, 257 (2001) (explaining that "the Supreme Court
endeavored to protect individual rights from cruel and abusive police tactics and
prevent false confessions"). After adopting the voluntariness standard as the test for
admissibility, the Supreme Court in subsequent cases expanded this test. See
Driver, supra note 36, at 43. The voluntariness test evolved into the "totality of the
circumstances" test. See id.; see also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963)
(declaring that "whether the confession was obtained by coercion or improper
inducement can be determined only by an examination of all of the attendant
circumstances").
43 See generally Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). In Hopt, the Supreme Court
established that a confession made to the police is inadmissible at trial unless it is
made voluntarily. Id. at 587; see also Driver, supra note 36, at 42-43 (explaining
that according to common law, a confession was deemed to be voluntarily if it was
"given in the absence of overt inducements, promises, threats, or actual bodily
harm").
44 See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
45 See Brennan, supra note 42, at 255.
46 168 U.S. 532 (1897). In Bram, the defendant, a sailor aboard a ship, was
suspected by the crew of murdering the ship's captain. See id. at 561. The crew
12932005]
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Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
clause47 provided a constitutional basis for the suppression of an
involuntary confession.48 As a result, compelled confessions were
inadmissible in federal criminal trials under the Fifth
Amendment. 49 Bram did not apply to state criminal trials
"[b]ecause the constitutional privilege against compelled self-
incrimination was not then considered a fundamental right."50 In
1936, however, the Court in Brown v. Mississippi 51 concluded
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provided a constitutional basis for excluding physically coerced
confessions in a state criminal trial.52
decided to arrest and restrain Brain while he was onboard the ship. See id. When
the ship reached land, the crew turned over the defendant to the police. See id. A
police detective then brought Brain to his private office, stripped him of his clothes,
interrogated him alone in his office, and elicited a confession. See id. at 561-62. To
encourage the confession, the detective told Brain that a witness named Brown, who
was actually a co-suspect, was standing at the wheel of the ship and saw Brain
commit the murder. See id. at 562-64. The Court concluded that Brain's
incriminating statements, which were offered into evidence as a confession, were not
voluntarily made because they were made under compulsion. See id. at 562-64.
47 See Adam M. Stewart, The Silent Domino: Allowing Pre-Arrest Silence as
Evidence of Guilt and the Possible Effect on Miranda, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 189,
191-92 (2004) (explaining that the framers of the Constitution created the privilege
against self-incrimination to prevent the type of physically abusive tactics that were
employed by the English courts).
48 See Bram, 168 U.S. at 542 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V) (explaining that
the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment governs issues concerning the
voluntariness of a confession).
49 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.01[B] [11 (explaining that "Bram brought the
common law rule under the umbrella of the Fifth Amendment: thereafter, compelled
statements were inadmissible in federal criminal trials as a matter of constitutional
law"); see also Bram, 168 U.S. at 543 (declaring that the language of the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause "was but a crystallization of the [common law]
doctrine as to confessions").
50 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.01[B][1]; see also Davies, supra note 38, at 1039(pointing out that in Twining v. New Jersey, the Court held that because the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was not a "fundamental right," it would
not apply to state criminal trials through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause (citing 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908))).
51 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown, the defendants were indicted for murder. Id.
at 279. A group of white men, accompanied by the sheriff, beat, whipped, and hung
the African-American defendants. Id. at 281-82. The sheriff made the defendants
understand that the torture would continue until they confessed to committing the
crime. Id. The Court held that the manner in which the confessions were obtained
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 286. The
Court explained that it was clear that the confessions were not made voluntarily and
therefore should have been excluded from evidence. Id. at 283.
52 The Supreme Court stated that "[i]t would be difficult to conceive of methods
more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the
1294 [Vol. 79:1287
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These two constitutional bases initially resulted in different
standards of admissibility in state and federal courts. 53 Under
the self-incrimination standard, federal courts followed the strict
bright-line rule announced in Bram to determine whether an
interrogation amounted to compulsion. 54 The bright-line rule
asserted that a confession was not made voluntarily if it was
extracted by the use of threats, violence, or promises.5 5  In
contrast, state courts followed the due process standard, which
required judges to examine not only the actions of the police but
also their likely effect on the suspect. 56 The due process
standard became known as the "totality of the circumstances"
test because it required a "case-by-case" assessment of all of the
circumstances surrounding an interrogation. 57
confessions... and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for
conviction and sentence was a clear denial.of due process." Brown, 297 U.S. at 286;
see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 607 (plurality opinion) (stating that "[a]
parallel rule governing the admissibility of confessions in state courts emerged from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also DRESSLER, supra
note 2, § 23.01[B][2]; Brennan, supra note 42, at 256 (explaining that the Brown
Court held that "a state conviction, based on a physically coerced confession, violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
53 While Bram applied the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to
federal criminal cases, Brown applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to state criminal cases. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.01[B][1]-[2].
54 The Brain Court asserted a bright-line rule:
[A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary; that
is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any
improper influence .... A confession can never be received in evidence
where the prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise ....
Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43 (internal citations omitted).
55 See id.
56 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.01[B][3] (contrasting the bright-line Bram
rule with the due process standard and explaining that "the early due process cases
seemingly required proof either that the suspect's will was broken by the police...
or that the police methods used were the sort likely to result in a false confession");
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 113-14 (1998)
(explaining that under the due process standard, judges were required to "examine
both the conduct of the police and its impact on the accused").
57 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433-34 (2000) (explaining that
the cases following Brown "refined the [due process voluntariness] test into an
inquiry that examines 'whether a defendant's will was overborne' by the
circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession") (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, §
23.01[B] [3] (declaring that "the due process cases are generally decided on a case-by-
case totality-of-the-circumstances basis"); Brennan, supra note 42, at 256 (pointing
out that the "modern voluntariness standard" arose out of Brown); supra note 42
and accompanying text (explaining that the voluntariness standard adopted by the
2005] 1295
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In subsequent cases, the Due Process Clause became the
primary constitutional basis used to exclude improper
confessions. 58 Courts began to apply the due process standard in
both state and federal cases. 59 Consequently, the bright-line rule
followed by the federal courts was replaced by the "totality of the
circumstances" test. 60
B. The Due Process Voluntariness Standard Evolved into a
"Totality of the Circumstances" Test
While the Court's holding in Brown made clear that
confessions obtained through physical coercion violated due
process, 61 it did not specifically prohibit confessions obtained
through psychological coercion. 62 Therefore, when the Supreme
Court began to suppress confessions obtained by violence and
torture, police began to employ psychologically coercive
interrogation techniques in order to obtain confessions from
suspects. 63  Consequently, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,64 the
Supreme Court held that confessions obtained as a result of
psychological coercion violate due process and are inadmissible at
Court was later expanded and required an assessment of the "totality of the
circumstances").
58 See Brennan, supra note 42, at 255. Initially, the federal self-incrimination
cases and the state due process cases applied different standards to determine
whether a confession was admissible at trial. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.01.
The federal cases following Bram applied a strict "bright-line rule" to determine
whether a confession was given voluntarily or made under compulsion. Id. The state
cases following Brown viewed the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the
interrogation in order to determine whether a confession was made voluntarily. Id.
As time passed, however, the federal courts also began to apply the due process
standard. See John Douard, Note, The Intrinsically Coercive Nature of Police
Interrogation, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 297, 301 (2001).
59 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-34 (explaining that federal courts also apply
the due process standard when assessing the voluntariness of a confession).
Although the Court in Malloy v. Hogan concluded that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applied to the states, this incorporation process
tended to work backwards. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.01[B][3] (citing Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)). Thus, the federal courts began to adopt the due process
standard followed by the states. Id.
60 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.03[A] (declaring that the bright-line rule
established by Bram has not prevailed).
61 Brennan, supra note 42, at 256.
62 Although "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment effectively
excluded confessions extracted with physical force .. . it was less effective at
excluding confessions obtained by psychologically coercive methods." Id.
63 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.03.
- 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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trial.6
In order to determine whether a confession is psychologically
coerced and therefore inadmissible at trial, the Court developed
the "totality of the circumstances" test.66 Originally, a confession
was considered psychologically coerced if obtained by 'improper
police methods."' 67  Lower courts, however, struggled to
determine what constituted 'improper police methods."' 68  The
Supreme Court, in response, refined the inquiry to focus on
"'whether a defendant's will was overborne."' 69 In order to assess
whether an interrogator '"overbore the will' of the suspect,
courts examined the circumstances surrounding the confession. 70
This "totality of the circumstances" test "required trial judges to
examine both the conduct of the police and its impact on the
accused."71
65 See id. at 154-55, 154 n.9 (recognizing that Supreme Court case law holds
that "a coerced or compelled confession cannot be used to convict a defendant in any
state or federal court"); see also Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions
and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 64 (2002) (explaining that
the Court "extended" the Brown rule to confessions "extracted through psychological
rather than physical coercion"). The "focus" of the Supreme Court "shifted in later
cases to determining whether psychological coercion occurred." Id. at 65. "[C]oercion
can be mental as well as physical, and.. . the blood of the accused is not the only
hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,
206 (1960).
66 Driver, supra note 36, at 43 (explaining that the "totality of the
circumstances" test required courts to assess both physical and psychological
coercion).
67 Brennan, supra note 42, at 257 (citation omitted); cf. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at
154 (describing the coercive police conduct at issue and calling it "irreconcilable with
the possession of mental freedom").
68 Brennan, supra note 42, at 257 (citation omitted).
69 Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
70 Id. (citation omitted).
71 Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 114. Under the totality of the circumstances
test, courts were to consider
whether the suspect was afforded adequate sleep and food, whether the
suspect was kept isolated from friends, family, and legal counsel, whether
the suspect was advised of the right to remain silent and to have an
attorney, whether a request for counsel was denied, whether the suspect
was kept in foreign surroundings, whether the suspect was taken before a
magistrate, whether the circumstances were imbued with the potential for
mob violence or other extrajudicial punishments, any threats made of legal
action involving members of the suspect's family, any humiliating
treatment of the suspect at the hands of the police, and whether more
sophisticated psychological methods were employed. The Court also took
into account the idiosyncratic characteristics of the suspect himself, such as
his educational, intelligence, and socio-economic levels, his age, his general
physical and psychological state, including whether he was under the
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The "totality of the circumstances" standard proved to be
extremely subjective,72 "unpredictable,"' 73 and "burdensome."74
As a result, this test provided the police and the courts with
"little guidance as to what conduct [was] constitutionally
permissible in questioning suspects." 75  Because of the general
lack of guidance offered by this "totality of the circumstances"
approach, 76 police continued to employ psychologically coercive
interrogation techniques. 77
C. The Miranda Court Replaced the "Totality of the
Circumstances" Test with a Bright-Line Rule
Because the "totality of the circumstances" test did not
influence of drugs or alcohol, his prior experience with the criminal justice
system, and his race.
Mannheimer, supra note 65, at 65-67 (footnotes omitted).
72 See Brennan, supra note 42, at 258 ("[T]he test is fact specific and relies
heavily on the discretion of judges."); Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 114 (stating that
the "value-laden" nature of the test results in "imprecision"); Welsh S. White, VVhat
Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2010 (1998) (positing
that "the question of whether an interrogation practice violates civilized standards of
decency depends on normative judgments relating to the legitimacy of particular
police practices").
73 See Brennan, supra note 42, at 257-58 (describing two cases with similar
facts that were decided within one year of each other yet which resulted in opposite
results); Mannheimer, supra note 65, at 70 ("[Ihe determination depended entirely
on a confluence of factors that might or might not later convince a court that the
confession was coerced."); Penney, supra note 41, at 361 (explaining that "[t]he case-
by-case balancing approach offered little guidance to lower courts and law
enforcement officials"); Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 114 (stating that "[u]nhelpful
declarations... riddled the Court's opinions").
74 See Brennan, supra note 42, at 258 ("Due to the court's discretion and the
fact-specific nature of the 'totality' test, it required extensive litigation at both the
trial and the appellate levels."). The Court only heard a very limited number of
confession cases each year due to its workload. See Penney, supra note 41, at 361.
75 DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 689; see also Marcus, supra note 6, at 100
(explaining that the totality of the circumstances standard does not provide clear
rules for courts to determine whether a confession is psychologically coerced); White,
supra note 72, at 2010 (declaring that the totality of the circumstances test "does not
provide a clear guideline ... [for] assessing whether a police practice unduly impairs
a suspect's freedom of choice").
76 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.03 ("[T]he totality-of-the-circumstances test
makes 'everything relevant but nothing determinative."') (quoting Joseph D. Grano,
Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph Over Substance and
Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243 (1986)).
77 See DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 689 (asserting that lack of guidance under the
due process standard increases the likelihood that police will employ psychologically
coercive interrogation techniques).
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adequately protect suspects, 78 the Supreme Court replaced this
test with a clear "bright-line" rule.7 9 In Miranda v. Arizona,80 the
Court explained that the "totality of the circumstances" test was
an unnecessary inquiry into the voluntariness and resulting
admissibility of a confession because "compulsion inheres in
custodial interrogation to such an extent that any confession, in
any case of custodial interrogation, is compelled."81  Therefore,
the Court concluded that unless procedural safeguards were
established, any confession obtained during a custodial
interrogation would necessarily result in unconstitutional
compulsion.8 2 Consequently, the Court implemented a bright-
line "warning and waiver system" designed to protect suspects.8 3
Miranda requires the police to warn an in-custody suspect
that she has the right to remain silent and the right to the
assistance of counsel during the interrogation.8 4 Furthermore,
78 See Penney, supra note 41, at 362 (explaining that the totality of the
circumstances test often forced courts to confront "conflicts in testimony between
police and defendants," the outcome of which was almost invariably "resolved in the
police's favor"); supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
79 See Brennan, supra note 42, at 259 (observing that the Miranda Court sought
to "simplify confession law"); DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 24.02 ("[B]y the early 1960s
the Court had become thoroughly dissatisfied with the imprecise 'voluntariness'
test .... Based upon thirty years of struggle with the doctrine.., the Court
concluded that the test resulted in 'intolerable uncertainty,' and that a bright-line
rule was needed.").
80 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
s Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good
Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 735 (1987); see also Miranda,
384 U.S. at 455 (declaring that "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals");
Mannheimer, supra note 65, at 70 (explaining that the Miranda Court concluded
that an assessment of the circumstances surrounding an interrogation is
unnecessary because all custodial interrogations are inherently coercive); infra note
82 (pointing out that the Miranda Court concluded that compulsion is inherently a
part of all custodial interrogations).
82 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("[W]ithout proper safeguards[,] the process of in-
custody interrogation.., contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely.").
83 Penney, supra note 41, at 366.
84 The Miranda Court required the following procedures:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
12992005]
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any response to police questioning is inadmissible unless the
police obtain a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
those rights.85 This bright-line warning and waiver requirement
provided the police with clear rules that effectively limited their
ability to coerce a suspect into a confession.8 6 Additionally, the
Miranda doctrine was easier for courts to apply because it
effectively eliminated the case-by-case inquiry that was required
by the "totality of the circumstances" test.8 7 Consequently, courts
were able to reach consistent results that served to regulate
police interrogation practices. 88 Overall, the bright-line Miranda
rule protected suspects because it informed them of their rights
during an interrogation, provided police with a clear standard of
conduct to follow, and facilitated judicial review.8 9
D. The Post-Miranda Exception Cases Have Undercut Miranda's
Bright-Line Rule
Although Miranda provided a "concrete" bright-line rule for
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him
of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
384 U.S. at 444-45.
85 Id. at 444.
86 See DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 689 (indicating that this bright-line rule
"offers police a clear standard of conduct, which, if followed, will predictably result in
the admission of a suspect's confession into evidence as part of the prosecution's case
in chief"); Penney, supra note 41, at 366 (stating that the Miranda Court set out a
bright-line rule for police to follow). If the police fail to comply with these procedures,
regardless of whether a suspect is already aware of her rights, a strong exclusionary
rule will apply: "[N]o evidence obtained as a result of [the] interrogation can be
used .... Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
87 See DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 689-90; Penney, supra note 41, at 366
(explaining that "[b]y setting out a bright line procedure for the police to follow, the
Miranda Court also hoped to facilitate judicial review and deter abusive practices").
88 See DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 689-90 (explaining that courts can reach
consistent decisions because the bright- line rule dictates that "if the Miranda
warnings were given to a suspect, and the suspect confessed, then the confession is
admissible"); Benjamin D. Cunningham, Comment, A Deep Breath Before the Plunge:
Undoing Miranda's Failure Before It's Too Late, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1375, 1379
(2004) (explaining that unless the bright- line Miranda rule is followed, courts must
bar the government from introducing, "in its case-in-chief, statements of a defendant
obtained from a custodial interrogation").
89 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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police officers and courts to follow, 90 the post-Miranda cases have
substantially undercut Miranda's warning/waiver requirements
by carving out exceptions. 91  In post-Miranda decisions, the
Supreme Court decided that the Miranda warnings were not
constitutionally required, 92 and therefore, the Court concluded
that Miranda's "merely prophylactic procedural rules" 93 could be
overridden in certain situations. 94 Consequently, in an effort to
aid law enforcement, the Supreme Court established a number of
exceptions to Miranda's seemingly bright-line standard.
95
The "impeachment exception" to Miranda was established in
Harris v. New York. 96 As a result of Harris, prosecutors can
introduce statements obtained in violation of Miranda to
impeach the credibility of a defendant if she should take the
stand.97 The Court expanded this holding in Oregon v. Hass.98 In
Hass, after the defendant was given his Miranda rights, he
indicated that he wished to speak to an attorney; however, the
officer continued interrogating the suspect despite this request. 99
The Hass Court held that the officer could still testify regarding
90 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 141 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42).
91 See Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1387 (stating that "the Miranda decision
was substantially undercut by gaping exceptions"); DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 639;
Leo & White, supra note 6, at 409.
92 See Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1387; Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda
Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth Amendment Synthesis, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 19, 20 (2000).
93 DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 639; see also Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1387;
Dripps, supra note 92, at 20.
94 See Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1387 (explaining that by interpreting the
Miranda warnings as a "prophylactic" rule rather than a constitutional requirement,
the Court was able to override the warnings in certain situations); Rosenberg &
Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 82 (stating that "the Justices have diluted Miranda by
denying its constitutional base"); Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 126 (declaring that
the "original vision of Miranda has been lost" because "the Court has separated the
warnings and waiver requirement from its constitutional underpinning").
95 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 143 (stating that recent decisions have
attempted to make the Miranda bright-line rule "less rigid" in an effort to aid law
enforcement).
96 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding that the defendant's credibility "was
appropriately impeached by the use of his [admissible] earlier conflicting
statements").
97 Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1388 (citing Harris, 401 U.S. at 226).
98 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (reversing the lower court ruling that an officer's
testimony for impeachment purposes was inadmissible on constitutional grounds
because the officer did not acknowledge the suspect's request for an attorney); see
also Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1388; Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 127.
99 See Hass, 420 U.S. at 714-18; see also Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1388-
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the statements that the defendant had made after he requested
an attorney for the purpose of the defendant's impeachment.100
Although the Supreme Court in Harris and Hass approved
the admissibility of statements obtained in violation of Miranda,
it never explicitly stated that Miranda warnings were not
constitutionally required. 101 The Court, however, in Michigan v.
Tucker, stated expressly what it had only implied in Harris and
Hass.10 2 As a result of Tucker, evidence and information acquired
as the "fruit" of a Miranda violation can still be used against a
defendant at trial. 0 3 The Tucker Court reasoned that evidence
or information obtained through a Miranda violation does not
need to be suppressed because the Miranda warnings are merely
"prophylactic" procedural rules that are not constitutionally
required.104
Future decisions relied upon the Tucker Court's conclusion
that Miranda rights are "prophylactic."105 In New York v.
Quarles,10 6 the characterization of Miranda rights as a non-
constitutional "prophylactic" rule permitted the Court to fashion
a "public safety" exception to Miranda's warning requirement. 107
The Quarles Court held that police officers are not required to
recite the Miranda warnings when questioning a suspect in
connection with a reasonable public safety concern. 08
Additionally, in Oregon v. Elstad, the Court relied on Tucker's
characterization of the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic."'109
In Elstad, the Court held that if an initial confession is obtained
100 See Hass, 420 U.S. at 723-24; see also Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1389
(citing Hass, 420 U.S. at 722).
101 See Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1389; Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 127.
102 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (declaring that "these procedural safeguards were
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to
insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected"); see also
Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1389; Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 128.
103 See Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 128; see also Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450-51.
104 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-46 (stating that "the police conduct at issue here
did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by
this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege"); see also Cunningham, supra
note 88, at 1389-90; Dripps, supra note 92, at 38-39; Weisselberg, supra note 56, at
128-29.
105 Cunningham, supra note 88, at 1391.
106 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
107 See Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 129.
108 Id. (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656).
109 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (quoting Thcker, 417 U.S. at 444); Cunningham,
supra note 88, at 1393-94.
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in violation of Miranda, the police officer may then recite the
Miranda warnings and obtain a second confession that will be
admissible at trial so long as the suspect waives her Miranda
rights.110
Overall, the post-Miranda cases have served to undermine
Miranda's bright-line rule.111 These cases declare that under
certain circumstances, even if police violate Miranda's warning
and waiver rules, a subsequent confession may still be admissible
at trial." 2 Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult for
lower courts to determine whether or not a particular confession
is admissible." 3 Therefore, courts must conduct an "agoniz[ing]
case-by-case review process."" 4  Consequently, because the
courts no longer strictly enforce the warning and waiver rules,
police often violate Miranda."15 As a result, Miranda currently
does not offer suspects the same level of protection that it
originally sought to establish."1
6
II. POST-MIRANDA INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
Police departments have developed interrogation techniques
that are designed to circumvent Miranda while operating within
the boundaries of what is legally permissible according to the
110 See Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317-18.
M See Marcus, supra note 6, at 94-95 (stating that as a result of the Supreme
Court's post-Miranda decisions, "Miranda no longer provides a 'bright line rule"');
see also Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH L.
REV. 1121, 1162 (2001) (explaining that "Dickerson v. United States left Miranda
standing, but with all of the exceptions and modifications that have been crafted
during the last thirty-five years").
112 See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text. Although Miranda held that
a statement obtained in violation of Miranda will not be admissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief, post-Miranda cases have held that such a statement may
be admitted to impeach the credibility of a defendant should he take the stand. See
Leo & White, supra note 6, at 409-10. Additionally, the post-Miranda cases indicate
that evidence acquired as a result of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda
may also be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Id.
113 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 93.
114 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 94, 112 (indicating that it is "unfortunate that
so many aspects of Miranda have become riddled by exceptions").
115 See Leo & White, supra note 6, at 414 (explaining that the "[p]ost-Miranda
cases have diluted the Miranda court's waiver requirements, thereby diminishing
the legal barriers that might restrict interrogators from using tactics designed to
induce Miranda waivers"); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 93 (stating that,
as a result of the post-Miranda decisions, police are now encouraged to violate
Miranda in certain instances).
116 See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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post-Miranda exception cases. 117 The post-Miranda exception
cases have concluded that, in certain situations, a confession
obtained in violation of Miranda's warning and waiver rules will
still be admissible at trial.118 Nowadays, as a result of the post-
Miranda decisions, police have found ways to obtain admissible
confessions while employing a substantial range of interrogation
techniques designed to circumvent the protections provided by
Miranda.119 Police officers are taught, through training manuals
and courses, how to convince suspects to waive their Miranda
rights and confess. 120
A. Overview of Interrogation Techniques Designed To Circumvent
Miranda
The many different interrogation techniques that police
commonly employ can be classified within three major
categories. 121 First, police try to avoid Miranda.22 Since police
are only required to recite Miranda warnings when a suspect is
in legal custody, police often avoid Miranda by "redefin[ing] the
circumstances of questioning so that the suspect technically is
not in custody."123  Second, police try to negotiate Miranda.24
That is, even in situations where police do issue the Miranda
117 See Leo & White, supra note 6, at 431-32.
118 See supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
119 See Leo & White, supra note 6, at 407-09, 408 n. 44 (stating that as a result
of the exception cases, police began to employ new interrogation techniques designed
to avoid Miranda); Weisselberg, supra 56, at 129-30 (explaining that the post-Miranda cases "created an incentive for police to disregard Miranda"); see also supra
notes 96-116.
120 DeFilippo, supra note 2, at 639; see Richard A. Leo, Questioning the
Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH L. REV. 1000, 1016(2001) (explaining that although police are required to read the Miranda warnings,they have developed techniques to circumvent Miranda while adhering to the letter
of the law); see also Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even theInnocent Have Confessed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al (explaining that the post-Miranda exception cases and the interrogation techniques designed to circumvent
Miranda have made the warnings "an easily slipped latch").
121 See Leo, supra note 120, at 1016; George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo,
The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: "Embedded" in Our National Culture?, in 29
CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 203, 249-52 (Michael Tonry ed., 2002).
122 Leo, supra note 120, at 1017. Perhaps the most fundamental police strategyis to do an end run around Miranda's requirements by taking advantage of the
"definitions, exceptions, and ambiguities in the [Miranda] doctrine itself, to use
Miranda to avoid Miranda." Thomas & Leo, supra note 121, at 249.123 See Leo, supra note 120, at 1017; Thomas & Leo, supra note 121, at 249-50.
124 Leo, supra note 120, at 1018-19; Thomas & Leo, supra note 121, at 250-51.
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warnings, they are "enormously successful" at controlling the
interrogation process and "moving past the Miranda moment to
elicit signed waivers."125 Third, police try to "question suspects
'outside Miranda."'1 26  That is, if a suspect does not waive her
Miranda rights, the interrogator may choose to resume
questioning in violation of Miranda to elicit information or a
statement that can be used for impeachment purposes.
1 27
Currently, it appears that Miranda "does little, if anything,
to protect suspects against abusive interrogation tactics" because
the exception cases have effectively destroyed Miranda's bright-
line warning and waiver rules.1 28 Although the goal of Miranda
was to prevent coercive interrogation techniques,
1 29  post-
Miranda decisions have caused an increase in such techniques.
1 30
The development of recent police strategies, arising out of the
post-Miranda cases, illustrates that police are continuing to use
"the same psychological methods of persuasion, manipulation,
125 Leo, supra note 120, at 1018; Thomas & Leo, supra note 121, at 250. In order
to obtain a waiver from a suspect, interrogators try to "minimiz[e], downplay[ ], or
deemphasiz[e]" the meaning of the Miranda warnings. Thomas & Leo, supra note
121, at 250. Police often accomplish this by delivering the Miranda warnings in a
manner that appears to be neutral. See Leo & White, supra note 6, at 432.
Additionally, they may try to deliver the warnings in a way that conceals their
adversarial role. See id. Furthermore, some police officers deliver the warnings in a
manner that leads the suspect to believe that waiving his rights will be beneficial.
See id.
126 See Leo, supra note 120, at 1020; Thomas & Leo, supra note 121, at 251-52;
Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 132 (explaining that proponents of this technique
encourage police officers to violate Miranda because although a statement obtained
in violation of Miranda cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, it can still
be used to serve other functions).
127 Leo, supra note 120, at 1020; Thomas & Leo, supra note 121, at 251-52. As a
result of Harris v. New York, which established the impeachment exception to
Miranda, prosecutors can use statements obtained in violation of Miranda to
impeach a defendant if she should take the stand. See Leo, supra note 120, at 1020.
Additionally, evidence and information acquired as a result of a Miranda violation
can still be used against a defendant at trial. Id. The post-Miranda cases provide
police officers with the incentive to question "outside Miranda." See id. This practice
has become more widely used over the past ten years, especially in California. Id.;
see also Weisselberg, supra note 56, at 133-36 (illustrating that a California District
Attorneys Association bulletin and a California Department of Justice issued
training manual and videotape all promote the use of the questioning "outside
Miranda" interrogation technique).
128 See Leo, supra note 120, at 1016-17; see also supra notes 111-115 and
accompanying text.
129 Leo, supra note 120, at 1021.
130 Id. at 1021-22. Police have learned to 'work Miranda' to their advantage"
through the use of strategic psychological interrogation techniques. Id. at 1016.
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and deception" that were criticized in Miranda. 131
B. The Question-First Interrogation Technique
The "question-first" tactic is a new interrogation strategy
that can be classified as a type of "interrogating outside
Miranda."132 This technique has "enabled law enforcement
officers formally to satisfy Miranda, while escaping its
procedural inconvenience."133 The "question-first" tactic involves
a two-step interrogation consisting of a "pre-warning" stage and a
"post-warning" stage.1 34  During the "pre-warning" stage, the
police officer will question the suspect without reading her the
Miranda warnings; 35 however, any confession obtained at this
stage of the interrogation will not be admissible at trial because
the suspect was not informed of her Miranda rights. 136 If the
suspect confesses during the "pre-warning" stage, the police
officer will continue with the "post-warning" stage of theinterrogation. 137 During the "post-warning" stage, the police
officer will read the Miranda warnings to the suspect and askher for a waiver. 138 Then, if the suspect waives her Miranda
rights, the police officer will re-question the suspect regarding
her "pre-warning" confession.139 The Police Law Institute
131 Id. at 1021; see Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery:
Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 785 (1997) (explaining thatdespite the Miranda Court's criticism of "deceptive interrogation techniques," police
manuals continue to instruct officers to employ them in order to illicit confessions);
see also supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
132 See Jerry Markon, Police Tactic To Sidestep Miranda Rights Rejected, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynarticles/A11895-2004Jun28.html (stating that the two-step process is referred to
as "interrogating outside Miranda").
133 United States v. Kiam, 343 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
134 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 605-06 (2004) (plurality opinion)(explaining that "Seibert sought to exclude both her prewarning and postwarning
statements").
135 Id. at 609 (explaining that during the first stage of the strategy, police
"withhold" the Miranda warnings).
136 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining that if the Miranda
warnings are not recited, then a subsequent confession is not admissible).
137 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 609-10 (plurality opinion) (indicating that after an
officer draws out a confession, he will begin the second stage of the interrogation).
13s See id. at 610 (explaining that after the suspect confesses, "officers may then
read the Miranda warnings and ask for a waiver").
139 See id. at 606 (stating that Officer Hanrahan testified he was taught to
"question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the question 'until I get the
answer that she's already provided once"').
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explained that because Miranda's warning and waiver
requirements are satisfied during this "post-warning" stage of
the interrogation, any subsequent statements regarding the
suspect's earlier confession will be deemed admissible at trial.
140
III. ASSESSING THE SEIBERT COURT'S MULTIFACTOR TEST
The admissibility of "post-warning" statements obtained by
the use of this two-step, "question-first" interrogation technique
"raises a new challenge to Miranda."14' In Missouri v. Seibert,142
the Supreme Court analyzed the "question-first" interrogation
technique. The Seibert Court held that the petitioner's post-
warning confession, obtained by the use of this technique, was
inadmissible at trial.1 43
A. The Seibert Court Devised a Multifactor Test
The Court explained that "when Miranda warnings are
inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing
interrogation, they are likely to mislead and 'depriv[e] a
defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the
nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning
them."' 144  Therefore, the plurality concluded that whenever a
two-step interrogation occurs, the admissibility of the post-
warning statements made by the suspect should depend on
"whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be
effective enough to accomplish their object" given the specific
facts of the case.' 45
To determine whether Miranda warnings delivered
midstream are effective, the Supreme Court devised a
multifactor test. 46  Under this multifactor test, the Court
140 See id. at 610 (explaining that "[i]f the arrestees waive their Miranda rights,
officers will be able to repeat any subsequent incriminating statements later in
court") (quoting POLICE LAW INST., ILLINOIS POLICE LAW MANUAL 83 (Jan. 2001-
Dec. 2003)).
141 Id. at 609.
142 Id. at 604. The plurality explained that the "threshold issue" presented. by
Seibert is "whether it would be reasonable to find that" the Miranda warnings "could
function 'effectively"' when a police officer questions a suspect first and then recites
the warnings later, after eliciting a confession from the suspect. Id. at 611-12.
143 See id. at 604.
144 Id. at 613-14 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)).
145 See id. at 615.
146 See id. (listing a series of relevant factors); see also United States v. Aguilar,
384 F.3d 520, 524 (8th Cir. 2004).
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examined
the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the
first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two
statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second[rounds], the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to
which the interrogator's questions treated the second round as
continuous with the first.147
After applying the multifactor test, the Court determined that
the Miranda warnings were ineffective in preparing Seibert for
the second stage of the interrogation.148 Therefore, the Court
concluded that Seibert's post-warning statements were
inadmissible at trial. 1 49
B. The Multifactor Test Should Be Discarded
Seibert's multifactor test is substantially similar to the
"totality of the circumstances" test. 150 That is, both tests require
trial judges to examine the circumstances surrounding an
interrogation in order to determine whether a suspect's
confession is admissible at trial. 151  The Miranda Court
concluded that the "totality of the circumstances" test was an
unnecessary inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession. 152
Consequently, because the multifactor test is so similar to the
"totality of the circumstances" test, it is also unnecessary.
Like the "totality of the circumstances" test, the multifactor
test is "extremely subjective, unpredictable, and burdensome."'153
The multifactor test is subjective because judges may place
147 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615 (plurality opinion).
148 See id. at 613-14.
149 See id. at 604.
150 See supra notes 71, 147 and accompanying text (listing the factors of both
tests).
151 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (illustrating that the totality of the
circumstances test requires trial judges to examine the conduct of the police and its
impact on the suspect); see also Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 (plurality opinion) (showing
that the Justices used the multifactor test to examine the conduct of the police and
its impact on Seibert in similar ways); Crawford v. State, 100 P.3d 440, 449 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2004) (stating that "the Seibert plurality held that the defendant's post-
Miranda statements were inadmissible [] objectively viewing the circumstances
from the defendant's position").
152 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
153 Supra notes 72-74 and accompany text. Because the multifactor test
resembles the "totality of the circumstances" test, it will similarly possess the same
inadequacies.
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different values on any given factor of the test. 15 4 Consequently,
the test is unpredictable because judges can come out differently
on the exact same facts. 155 Additionally, the multifactor test is
burdensome on judicial resources because it requires an
extensive case-by-case review process.
156
Because the multifactor test is soft and "value-laden," it does
not adequately protect suspects who are subjected to two-step
interrogations.1 57 The multifactor test also does not create a rule
requiring that suspects be advised of their rights during a two-
step interrogation. 158 Furthermore, the Seibert test does not
provide police with a clear standard of conduct to follow because
it does not establish precise limits. 159 As a result, the police have
little incentive to discontinue the use of intentional two-step
interrogations.1 60  In addition, the multifactor test does not
facilitate judicial review because it provides courts with little
guidance as to what will make a post-warning statement
154 In Medley v. Commonwealth, 602 S.E.2d 411, 419 (Va. Ct. App. 2004), the
majority concluded that the conduct of the suspect indicated that he understood his
Miranda rights and the fact that he waived them. The dissent, however, argued that
the conduct of the police illustrated that they "persisted in repeated efforts to wear
down [the suspect's] resistance and make him change his mind." See id. at 426
(Benton, J., dissenting) (quoting Mosley v. Michigan, 423 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1975)).
155 See id. at 420 (majority opinion) (illustrating that the majority denied the
motion to suppress Medley's statements based on its evaluation of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation). But see id. at 426 (Benton, J., dissenting) (showing
that the dissenting judges would suppress Medley's statements based on their view
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation).
156 Because the multifactor test does not provide judges with much guidance as
to when a suspect's confession is inadmissible at trial, it leaves much of the decision
making up to the judges themselves. See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying
text. Consequently, applying the multifactor test to a given situation may be time
consuming because it requires an in-depth analysis. See, e.g., Medley, 602 S.E.2d at
420, 426 (Benton, J., dissenting) (illustrating that applying the multifactor test
requires careful consideration because reasonable judges may weigh factors
differently and reach opposite opinions on how a case should be resolved).
157 See supra notes 72, 78 and accompanying text (discussing problems caused
by the similar "totality of the circumstances" test).
158 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613-14 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(showing that the multifactor test listed factors for a court to consider but did not
create any bright-line rule that serves to inform suspects of their rights).
159 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing similar problems
caused by the "totality of the circumstances" test); see supra notes 153-54 and
accompanying text (illustrating that because the test is subjective and unpredictable
by nature, it does not offer any clear rules that must be followed).
160 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (pointing out that police still
employed coercive techniques under the "totality of the circumstances" test).
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admissible at trial.161 As a result, courts may improperly admit
involuntary post-warning confessions.162 In sum, the multifactor
test should be discarded because it does not provide suspects,
police officers, or courts with clear rules.1 63
IV. THE MULTIFACTOR TEST SHOULD BE REPLACED WITH A
BRIGHT-LINE WARNING RULE
A bright-line warning rule is needed to govern the
admissibility of post-warning statements made by suspects. The
Miranda Court replaced the "totality of the circumstances" test
with a bright-line warning rule.164  Justice Blackman has
written: "Miranda's holding has the virtue of informing
police.., with specificity as to what they may do in conducting
custodial interrogation[s], and of informing courts under what
circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation[s]
are not admissible. This gain in specificity ... benefits the
accused. .. ."165 Miranda provided both police officers and the
courts with clear rules to follow.1 66 Similar to Miranda, the
Court should also replace the multifactor test with a bright-line
warning rule that can adequately protect suspects during two-
step interrogations. 167
The Court should devise a bright-line rule requiring police
161 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (contending that another
problem caused by the similar "totality of the circumstances" test was that it did not
provide guidance to the courts).
162 See supra note 154 (indicating that judges may differ in opinion when
applying the multifactor test).
163 See Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on
the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59,
95 (1966) (explaining that the "totality of the circumstances" test did not provide any
bright-line rules concerning acceptable conduct in an interrogation setting); Marcus,
supra note 6, at 100 (stating that the "totality of the circumstances" test "[wa]s oflimited value to the establishment of workable rules for the criminal justice
system"); White, supra note 72, at 2010 (explaining that the "totality of the
circumstances" test "d[id] not provide a clear guideline").
164 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
165 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 112 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
718 (1979)). Furthermore, Justice Brennan has stated: "We recognize here theimportance of a workable rule 'to guide police officers, who have only limited time
and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in
the specific circumstances they confront."' Marcus, supra note 6, at 112 (quoting
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
166 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 112.
167 See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text (describing the similar virtues
of Miranda's bright-line warning and waiver rules).
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during a two-step interrogation to recite an additional warning
after reading the Miranda rights to the suspect. This
supplemental warning should be required in both intentionally
and unintentionally employed two-step interrogations because a
suspect may not understand her Miranda rights regardless of the
interrogator's intentions. If police do not follow these procedures,
then a post-warning statement should not be admissible at trial.
This additional warning should read as follows:
The statements that you just made will probably not be
admissible at trial because you were never informed of your
Miranda rights prior to questioning. Now that your Miranda
rights have been read to you, you have been advised that you
retain the right to remain silent and the right to counsel when
questioning is resumed. Any statements that you now make
may be used as evidence against you in court.
Unlike the multifactor test, this bright-line warning
requirement will protect suspects subjected to two-step
interrogations because it provides suspects, police officers, and
courts with clear rules. 168 The additional warning explains to the
suspect that she retains the right to remain silent and the right
to counsel during the post-warning stage of the interrogation.
Furthermore, the warning requirement provides police with
precise rules that will limit their ability to coerce a suspect into
confessing.169 This bright-line rule is easy for courts to apply
because it dictates that if an officer follows the required
procedures, then the post-warning confession is admissible as
part of the prosecution's case in chief.170 Therefore, courts will be
able to reach consistent decisions that will serve to regulate the
use of two-step interrogation practices by police. 171 In sum, the
bright-line warning rule will adequately protect suspects
subjected to two-step interrogations because it promotes the
clarity that the Miranda Court originally attempted to establish
by informing suspects of their rights, providing police with a
clear standard of conduct to follow, and facilitating judicial
review. 172
168 See supra notes 83-89 (finding that the clarity of Miranda's bright-line rule
serves to protect suspects).
169 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Nowadays, Miranda does not offer suspects the same level of
protection that it originally sought to establish because the
exception cases have effectively destroyed Miranda's bright-line
warning and waiver rules. This Comment has suggested that
replacing the Court's multifactor test in Seibert with a bright-line
supplemental warning rule will serve to reinforce and strengthen
the Miranda doctrine. The multifactor test created by the Court
does not provide a bright-line rule because it is plagued by the
same deficiencies as the "totality of the circumstances" test.
Because the multifactor test resembles the "totality of the
circumstances" test, it similarly does not provide clear rules and
therefore is not capable of strengthening Miranda.
The bright-line warning rule will adequately protect suspects
from two-step interrogation techniques because it strengthens
Miranda's own bright-line rule. That is, the additional warning
requirement serves to reinforce the Miranda warnings by
informing suspects of their rights, providing police with a clear
standard of conduct to follow, and facilitating judicial review.
Consequently, the bright-line warning rule will effectively
eliminate coerced confessions because it provides clear guidelines
that will help ensure that only truly voluntary confessions will be
admitted at trial.
Currently, the Miranda doctrine is in critical condition and
the Seibert Court should have taken a tougher position against
two-step interrogations in order to preserve Miranda's
protections. Although the bright-line supplemental warning rule
only applies in certain situations, it is a step in the right
direction toward strengthening Miranda. In sum, the Court
needs to take a stronger stance against coercive post-Miranda
interrogation techniques in order to protect suspects' rights.
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